

*Curriculum Vitae*  
**TED PARENT**  
August 2017

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Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University  
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**EMPLOYMENT:**

Virginia Tech, Department of Philosophy: Visiting Assistant Professor, Aug. 2009 – present.

Vanderbilt University, Department of Philosophy: Lecturer, Aug. 2008 – Aug. 2009.

**EDUCATION:**

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Ph.D. (Philosophy), Aug. 2009.

Dissertation: “Metasemantics: On the Limits of Semantic Theory.”

Committee: William G. Lycan (Director), Dorit Bar-On, Thomas Hofweber, Ram Neta, Keith Simmons.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: M.A. (Philosophy), May 2002.

Masters Thesis: “Introspection and Its Epistemology.”

Committee: William G. Lycan (Director), Dorit Bar-On, Douglas C. Long.

Indiana University, Bloomington: M.A. (Philosophy), May 2000.

University of Portland: B.A., *maxima cum laude* and Honors Program; (Philosophy and English with French minor), May 1998.

**PRIMARY RESEARCH AREAS:**

Philosophy of Mind & Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics.

**PUBLICATIONS:**

Monograph:

(2017). *Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind*. New York: Routledge.

Research Articles:

1. (2017). “Content Externalism and Quine’s Criterion are Incompatible,” *Erkenntnis* 82(3): 625-639.

## [Publications, continued]

2. (2016). "The Modal Ontological Argument meets Modal Fictionalism," *Analytic Philosophy* [formerly *Philosophical Books*] 57(4): 338-352.
3. (2016). "The Empirical Case against Infallibilism," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 7(1): 223-242.
4. (2016). "An Objection to the Laplacean Chalmers," *Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 47(1): 237-240.
5. (2015). "Rule Following and Metaontology," *Journal of Philosophy* 112(5): 247-265.
6. (2015). "Externalism and 'Knowing What' One Thinks," *Synthese* 192(5): 1337-1350.
7. (2015). "Self-Knowledge and Externalism about Empty Concepts," *Analytic Philosophy* [formerly *Philosophical Books*] 56(2): 158-168.
8. (2015). "On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument," *Philosophia* 43(2): 475-483.
9. (2015). "Theory Dualism and the Metalogic of Mind-Body Problems," *Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods*, C. Daly (ed.). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, pp. 497-526.
10. (2014). "Ontic Terms and Metaontology, or: On What There Actually Is," *Philosophical Studies* 170(2): 199-214.
11. (2014). "Knowing-*Wh* and Embedded Questions," *Philosophy Compass* 9(2): 81-95.
12. (2013). "In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious," *The Monist* 96(4): 608-624.
13. (2013). "Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann," *Dialectica* 67(3): 353-358.
14. (2013). "Note on Induction," *Think* [Cambridge UP] 12(33): 37-39.
15. (2008). "Quine and Logical Truth," *Erkenntnis* 68(1): 103-112.
16. (2007). "Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge," *Philosophical Studies* 133(3): 411-424.

## Reviews and Encyclopedia Entries:

- (forthcoming). "Review of *A Critical Introduction to Modality* by A. Borghini," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.
- (forthcoming). "Review of *Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence*, edited by M. García-Carpintero and G. Martí," *Analysis Reviews*.

[Publications, continued]

(2017). “Externalism and Self-Knowledge,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, E. Zalta (ed.). Revised version (first published in 2013). <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge-externalism/>.

(2012). “Modal Metaphysics,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.). <http://www.iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/>.

### **WORKS IN PROGRESS:**

“Actualist Meinongianism” [complete draft].

“Composites without ‘Composition’ (Remarks prompted by Barker & Jago).”

“Contextualism about Ontological Commitment—Against Writing a ‘Book of the World’.”

“Modal Realism and the Meaning of ‘Exist’” [complete draft].

“A New Modal Liar” [complete draft].

“Ontological Commitment and Quantification” [invited for *The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics*, R. Bliss & J. Miller (Eds.)]

“Paradox with Just Self-Reference” [complete draft].

“A Puzzle about Kinds and Kind Terms” [complete draft].

### **PAPER PRESENTATIONS:**

“Theory Dualism and the Heterological Paradox in the Philosophy of Mind,” invited keynote address [billing shared with Graham Priest], 13<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Oct. 2016.

“A Puzzle about Kinds and Kind Terms,” presented at the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mar. 2016.

“Externalism and Cartesian Self-Knowledge,” presented at the University College Dublin, Feb. 2016.

“Second-Order Judgment and Autological Expression,” invited for the Workshop in Philosophy of Mind, Virginia Tech, April 2015.

“Theory Dualism: Incomplete Physicalism b/w Mental Fictionalism,” invited for the Conference on Mental Fictionalism, University of Edinburgh, July 2014.

[Presentations, continued]

“The Modal Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism,” presented at the Illinois Philosophical Association, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Nov. 2013.

“On Rasmussen’s Modal Cosmological Argument,” presented at 65<sup>th</sup> Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Pacific University, Oct. 2013.

“Rule Following and Metaontology,” presented at the Philosophy Department Colloquium Series, Virginia Tech, Sept. 2013.

“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge II: Autological Judgment,” presented at the Conference on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, University of Glasgow, June 2013.

“In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious,” presented at the 64<sup>th</sup> Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Oregon State University, Nov. 2012.

“Rule Following and Metaontology,” presented at the 4<sup>th</sup> Regional Wittgenstein Conference, Washington & Lee University, Mar. 2012.

“Modal Realism and the Meaning of ‘Exist’,” presented at the 63<sup>rd</sup> Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Lewis & Clark College, Nov. 2011.

“Modal Realism and the Meaning of ‘Exist’,” presented at the Philosophy Department, Virginia Tech, Oct. 2010.

“What the Externalist Cannot Know A Priori,” presented at the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Feb. 2010.

“Ontic Terms and Metaontology,” presented at the Philosophy Department Colloquium Series, Virginia Tech, Oct. 2009.

“What Does the Slow-Switch Argument Show?” presented at the Philosophy Department Colloquium Series, Vanderbilt University, Oct. 2008.

“What Does the Slow-Switch Argument Show?” presented at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Oct. 2008.

“On What There Actually Is,” presented at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Sept. 2007.

“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge,” presented at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2004.

“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge,” presented at the Mid-South Conference in Philosophy, University of Memphis, Feb. 2004.

[Presentations, continued]

“Quine and Logical Truth,” presented at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2004.

“Quine and Logical Truth,” presented at the 55<sup>th</sup> Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Reed College, Oct. 2003.

“The Coherence Theory of Subjective Probability,” presented at Indiana University, Mar. 2000.

“The Liar Paradox, T-Sentence Analysis, and Epistemology,” presented at the Meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association, DePauw University, Nov. 1998.

### **INVITED COMMENTARIES:**

On Joseph Vukov’s “How Sparse Properties Save Nicod’s Principle,” presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2017.

On Antti Kauppinen’s “The Practical Self and the Experiential Self,” presented at the Pacific APA “pre-conference” on Transformative Experience, Apr. 2017.

On Everett Fulmer’s “Tame and Vicious Circularity,” presented at the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mar. 2017.

On Mark Jago’s “States of Affairs,” presented at the University of Edinburgh, Midsummer Philosophy Workshop, June 2015.

On James Davies’ “Mathematical Fictionalists Cannot Be Sceptics about Reference to Abstract Objects,” presented at the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Feb. 2015.

On Justin Remof’s “Object Constructivism and Unconstructed Objects,” presented at the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mar. 2014.

On Kate Nolfi’s “Why We Ought to Care about the Epistemic Status of our Beliefs,” presented at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Feb. 2014.

On Joseph Hedger’s “Frege’s Puzzle Left Unsolved: Reply to Sainsbury & Tye,” presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mar. 2013.

On Derek Ball & Brian Pickel’s “One Dogma of Millianism,” presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2012.

On Pieranna Garavaso & Niela Vassallo’s “Frege’s Thinking,” presented at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2011.

[Commentaries, continued]

On Andrew Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen's "Physicalism and the Puppet Argument," presented at the Illinois Philosophical Association, Nov. 2011.

On Daniel Pearlman's "Modifying the Interventionalist Solution to the Problem of Causal Exclusion," presented at Lewis & Clark College: 63<sup>rd</sup> Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Nov. 2011.

On David Cheely's "The Role of Memory in the Fineness of Grain of Demonstrative Concepts," presented at the Kentucky Philosophical Association, Apr. 2011.

On Jason Decker's "Quining Quarrels: Indifference and Deep Agnosticism," presented at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2010.

On Alex Grzankowski's "Are All Attitudes Propositional Attitudes?," presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2010.

On Tuomas Manninen's "An Argument Against Animalism," presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2009.

On Chase Wrenn's "Practical Success and the Nature of Truth," presented at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2007.

On Ryan Robinson's "Tibbles without Tib," presented at Reed College: 55<sup>th</sup> Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Oct. 2003.

## **TEACHING EXPERIENCE:**

*\* indicates an independent study*

Virginia Tech:

*Grad Level:* Philosophy of Language, Modality and Ontology, Metaontology, Symbolic Logic [incl. soundness and completeness], Metaphilosophy, Self-Knowledge, \*Philosophy and Neuroscience, \*Kripke, \*Analytic Existentialism, \*Philosophy of Religion [for Fall 2017]

*Majors/Grad Level:* Philosophy of Mind (Writing Intensive), Metaphysics (Writing Intensive), Philosophy of Science, Modal Logic and Its Applications, Existentialism.

*Undergrad Level:* Knowledge and Reality [Intro M&E], Philosophy of Religion, Symbolic Logic, Reason and Revolution [Intro Phil Science], Language and Logic [Critical Thinking], Morality and Justice.

Vanderbilt University: Introduction to Philosophy (Writing Intensive), General Logic [Critical Thinking].

Duke University: Symbolic Logic.

[Teaching, continued]

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Introduction to Philosophy, Experience and Reality [Intro M&E], Symbolic Logic, Philosophy of Religion, \*Epistemology

### **FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:**

Mary Williams Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Aug. 2004 and Sept. 2005.

Graduate School Opportunity Grant, June 2004.

Bertha Williams Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Jan. 2004.

Fellow, Future Faculty Program, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Aug. 2003.

Kenan Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Nov. 2002.

Henry Horace Williams Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Sept. 2000, Jan. 2001, Sept. 2001, Jan. 2002, Jan. 2003, & Sept. 2003.

The Open Fellowship, Indiana University, Bloomington, Aug. 1998.

### **DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY, AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:**

Referee [selected], *American Philosophical Quarterly* (x3), *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (x8), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (x2), Congress of the *Philosophical Association*, Continuum Books (x3), *Dialectica*, *Episteme*, *Erkenntnis* (x5), *Journal of Philosophical Research* (x3), *Mind*, *Mind & Language*, MIT Press, *The Monist*, Oxford University Press (x3), *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Philosophical Quarterly* (x3), *Philosophical Studies* (x2), *Ratio* (x2), *Res Philosophica*, Routledge Books, Springer Books, *Synthese* (x6), *Theoria*.

Bibliography on “Analytic Existentialism” (1200+ downloads on Academia.edu), Aug. 2015.

Editor, “Ontology” category on Phil Papers (Bourget & Chalmers, General Eds.), <http://philpapers.org/browse/ontology>, Jan. 2013. Includes the subcategory “Existence.”

Editor, “Knowledge-Wh” category on Phil Papers (Bourget & Chalmers, General Eds.), <http://philpapers.org/browse/knowledge-wh>, Nov. 2012.

Editor, “Externalism and Self-Knowledge” category on Phil Papers (Bourget & Chalmers, General Eds.), <http://philpapers.org/browse/externalism-and-self-knowledge>, June 2011. Includes the subcategories “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge,” “Externalism and Slow-Switching,” and “Externalism and Self-Knowledge, misc.”

[Service, continued]

Masters Committee Member, La Trobe University (external examiner): Spring 2017  
Virginia Tech: Spring of 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, and 2010.

Member, *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Dec. 2006–present.

Research Assistant for Dorit Bar-On, Fall 2004 and Spring 2008.

Teaching Assistant Co-ordinator, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina,  
Chapel Hill, July 2004 – July 2005. Responsible for running teaching workshops, and  
coordinating as well as advising the department’s teaching assistants.

Member, *American Philosophical Association*, Fall 1998, 2000–present.

#### **OTHER LANGUAGES:**

German (reading only), French

#### **REFERENCES:**

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[References, continued]

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