

**Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§138-242**

Differences with the *Tractatus*

- Deliberately anti-systematic, anti-theoretical. Proceed case-by-case.
- Language as a “game,” vs. a system for naming.
- Shift of focus: from metaphysics of meaning, to linguistic understanding.
- Methodology: Clarifying a philosophical matter consists in describing the “rules of the game,” the “grammar” of the problematic expressions.

*§§138-155. The Grammar of “Understanding”*

§138. “If meaning is use...” Consequences for linguistic understanding.

§§139-141. Understanding does not consist in picturing.

§142. Without “normal” cases, language games lose their point (cf. §242)

§§143-5. Our criteria for someone understanding a series are behavioral.

§146. Continuing a series is not the derivation of a series from a formula.

§§147-8. Understanding the series is not a dateable, occurrent mental state.

§§149-150. Understanding (in a rarified sense) is a disposition; better: an ability.

§151. “Eureka!” moments don’t show that your understanding is dateable, occurrent mental state.

§§152-3. There is no common mental process to cases of understanding.

§154-5. The particular circumstances warrant self-attributions of understanding.

*§§156-171. Reading as a Case Study.*

§156. Reading is not a “distinctive conscious activity”

§§157-8. Reading is not an internal activity, but a way of reacting to words.

§§159-160. Reading is not characterized by special sensations.

§161. A challenge to strictly demarcating cases of reading.

§§162-4. Reading is not deriving, except in quite a special sense.

§§165-8. Reading is not the words occurring to me “in a distinctive way”.

§§169-171. Reading is not just words causally influencing behavior.

*§§172-178. General Remarks on Being Guided.*

§§172-7. Being guided is not a particular experience.

§178. Being guided is not characterized as some kind of “movement.”

§§179-190. *Knowing How to Go On.*

§§179-180. Knowing how to go on does not consist in having a particular experience; it is due to the circumstances that the attribution is warranted.

§§181-2. Failing to go on is a many-splendored thing.

§183. No universal sufficient conditions for knowing that one can go on.

§§184-8. Knowing how to go on differs from knowing the entire series laid out.

§§189-190. Knowing how to go on does not consist in knowing a formula.

§§191-242. *Rule-Following*

§§191-2. Grasping a rule “at a stroke” has no model; it’s a philosophical error.

§§193-4. What we assume re: a machine *qua* symbol does not apply to a machine.

§§195-6. The rule for use is not present in a moment “in a queer way.”

§197. Talk of grasping “at a stroke” is compatible with meaning as use.

§§198-202. The rule-following paradox, and “custom” as the solution [Handout 2]

§203. Labyrinth remark.

§204-5. A custom for game-playing is necessary for inventing an unplayed game.

§206-7. Translating an unknown language takes “shared behavior” as a given.

§§208-214. Teaching by examples does not determine use, but it doesn’t need to.

§§215-16. Identity-claims can be applied differently; the “fitting” metaphor fails.

§217. “My spade is turned.”

§§218-223. The “rails to infinity” are at best symbolic, if not mythological.

§§224-8. Following a “rule” means acting in the “same” way.

§§229-231. Rails to infinity again.

§232. Following a rule is not a matter of being inspired.

§§233-236. Rule-following is not a matter of calculating.

§237. The Pair of Compasses: “It seems to *intimate* how to go, but it’s not a rule.”

§238-240. Following a rule is “a matter of course.”

§241-242. Agreement in linguistic judgments is agreement in a “form of life,” and not agreement in other opinions.