

Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§243-315

§§243-55. *The Privacy of Sensation*

- §243. Some language-games can be solitary, but not naming private sensations.
§§244-5. One learns to use 'pain' in place of crying; it does not describe the pain.
§§246-8. "only I can know" my pain is either silly or simply illustrates usage.
§§249-50. Lying is an acquired language-game.
§§251-2. An "*a priori*" proposition: No image of its negation.
§253. "No one can have THIS pain!" But type-identical pains, also, Siamese twins.
§§254-5. What we are "tempted to say" is not philosophical, but it is subject to philosophical treatment.

§§256-80. *Private Language*

- §§256-7. Often sensations are tied to public expression, thus convention.
§§258-67. Inner ostension has no criterion of correctness.
§268. Private ostension has no practical consequences.
§269. *Second voice*: "Appearing to understand" suggests a subjective (private) understanding of a language.
§§270-1. *Reply to second voice*: The use of 'pain' in accord with "symptoms" of pain is all that matters.
§§272-80. Color terms are public; they cannot denote an essentially private thing.

§§281-92. *The Attribution of Sensation*.

- §§281-284. No *identifying* pain with pain-behavior (*à la* behaviorism). Our *practice* is to attribute sensation only to things that behave in specific ways.
§285. Remark about facial expressions.
§§286-7. Persons have pains, not bodies (even though pain can be "in" the body).
§288. Doubting if pain is caused by a pin prick merely calls into question your acquisition of 'pain'.
§§289-291. 'Pain' is used *sans* justification (but since it's non-descriptive it's ok).
§292. Remark about "reading off" facts, in light of the rule-following argument.

§§293-315. *The “Object-Name” Model of ‘Pain’*

§293. The beetle in the box: The “object-name” model of ‘pain’ makes the pain irrelevant to the language-game.

§§294-8. Further objections to the “object-name” model.

§299. In philosophy, an urge to say “*p*” does not force “*p*” as an assumption.

§§300-3. Pain in the imagination is not a picture of the pain.

§304. Pain exists, but only pain-behavior matters to language-games.

§§305-6. Remembering is also misconstrued as “inner picturing.”

§§307-8. Behaviorism and the like falsely assume some common “metaphysical underpinning” to all talk of pain.

§309. Showing the fly out of the fly-bottle.

§310. Another illustration of Wittgenstein’s “expressivism” about pain-talk.

§§311-314. The private exhibition of pain is an illusion.

§315. “One who never felt pain would not understand ‘pain’” is dubious.