For a list of all publications and works-in-progress, see my C.V.

An overarching concern in my work is: What are the limits of philosophical inquiry? The issue concerns cognitive limits, but often it is not an epistemic issue about limited evidence on answers to philosophical questions. It is rather about whether we can adequately articulate such answers in the first place. More details are available HERE, and in the abstracts below.

Feedback is always welcome

Self-Knowledge and the Philosophy of Mind

Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind  New York: Routledge, 2017.
Above is a link to excerpts from the book—included is the front matter, §1 of the preamble, and chapter 1. You can buy the book HERE or HERE.

Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge  Philosophical Studies 133.3; Apr. 2007, pp. 411424.

Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann  Dialectica, 67.3; Sept. 2013, pp. 353–358.

Externalism and Self-Knowledge  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Summer 2013, E. Zalta (ed.), URL = <>.

Externalism and Knowing What” One Thinks  Synthese, 192.5; May 2015, pp. 13371350.

Self-Knowledge and Externalism about Empty Concepts  Analytic Philosophy, 56.2; June 2015, pp. 158-168.

The Empirical Case against Infallibilism  Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7.1; March 2016, pp. 223-242.

Colivan Commitment vis-à-vis Moore's Paradox  Philosophia, 47.2; April 2019, pp. 323-333.

Other Philosophy of Mind & Epistemology

I Think; Therefore, I am a Fiction  Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations, T. Demeter, T. Parent, & A. Toon (eds.). New York: Routledge, forthcoming.

Theory Dualism and the Metalogic of Mind-Body Problems  Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, C. Daly (ed.). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. pp. 497–526.

In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious  The Monist, 96.4; Oct. 2013, pp. 605621.

Knowing-Wh and Embedded Questions  Philosophy Compass, 9.2; Feb. 2014, pp. 8195.

Note on Induction  Think [Cambridge UP], 12.33; Mar. 2013, pp. 3739.


A Critique of Metaphysical Thinking
The above link is to a draft of the front matter and chapter 1 for a new book manuscript.

Ontological Commitment and Quantifiers  Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, R. Bliss & J. Miller (eds.). New York: Routledge, forthcoming.

Ontic Terms and Metaontology, or: On What There Actually Is  Philosophical Studies, 170.2; Sept. 2014, pp. 199–214.

Rule Following and Metaontology  Journal of Philosophy, 112.5; May 2015, pp. 247265.

An Objection to the Laplacean Chalmers  Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 47.1; April 2016, pp 237240.

Content Externalism and Quine's Criterion are Incompatible  Erkenntnis, 82.3; June 2017, pp 625639.

Ontology & Modality

Modal Metaphysics  Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Mar. 2012, J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.),

On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument  Philosophia, 43.2; June 2015, pp. 475483.

The Modal Ontological Argument meets Modal Fictionalism  Analytic Philosophy, 57.4; Dec. 2016, pp. 338352.

Modal Realism and the Meaning of 'Exist'

Conservative Meinongianism: An Actualist+ Meta/Ontology

Language & Logic

Quine and Logical Truth  Erkenntnis 68.1; Jan. 2008, pp. 103112.

A Dilemma about Kinds and Kind Terms  Synthese, forthcoming.

The Premise Paradox

A New Modal Liar

Paradox with just Self-Reference

Contradiction is Derivable from the Fixed Point Lemma

Bonus: An Exchange on Logical Form between William G. Lycan and myself.

If you are looking for the bibliography I compiled on analytic existentialism, click HERE.